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Abstract
In this article I inquire into the question of cultural continuity against the background of 
the problem of modernity through the medium of the specific case of New Confucian phi­
losophy. I reflect on the import of the concept of “culture” from a historical point of view 
and investigate how the Hegelian notion of “Spirit” was employed by modern Confucian 
philosophers such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi as a conceptual strategy in the face of 
the structural and semantic discontinuities resulting from modernization. I single out the 
symbolic May Fourth Movement in order to approach Mou’s and Tang’s attitude towards 
historical (dis)continuity and point towards the contemporary significance of their philo­
sophical undertaking.
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1. Modernity and the semantics 
  of cultural continuity
On	the	first	pages	of	his	Introduction to Philosophy,	the	professor	of	philo-
sophy	and	Hegel	specialist	Zhang	Shiying	makes	a	case	for	 the	continuing	
relevance	of	philosophical	 thought	 in	 the	modern	world.	He	concludes	his	
plea	with	the	following	evocative	passage:
“In	today’s	age	of	burgeoning	markets	and	the	daily	increasing	development	of	science	and	tech-
nology	people	are	on	the	one	hand	focused	on	pursuing	their	own	interests	and	striving	for	the	
possession	of	concrete	things,	while	on	the	other	hand	they	cannot	but	continue	to	inquire	into	
the	ultimate	meaning	of	life	and	pursue	some	of	the	greatest	problems	of	universal	importance.	
Here	we	find	an	incredibly	wealthy	individual	sighing	over	his	personal	sense	of	spiritual	empti-
ness,	as	if	he	didn’t	have	a	thing	in	the	world.	There	we	find	an	entrepreneur	standing	on	the	
top	floor	of	the	Jin	Mao	Tower	in	Shanghai	still	reciting	verses	by	the	Tang	dynasty	poet	Chen	
Zi’ang:	The past offers no glimpse of the ancients / The future shows no sign of those still to come 
/ When I contemplate the infinity of the world/ I shed mournful tears in solitude.	All	of	this	goes	
to	show	that	most	people	living	in	today’s	world	also	engage	in	philosophical	reflection.”1
1
Zhang	 Shiying,	An Introduction to Philoso­
phy	(Zhexue daolun),	Beijing:	Beijing	daxue	
chubanshe,	 2002,	 p.	 2.	Unless	otherwise	 in-
dicated,	all	translations	in	this	article	are	my	
own.
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As	is	clear	from	this	passage	and	the	context	in	which	it	figures,	Zhang	Shiying	
is	making	a	general	argument	for	the	importance	of	philosophy	in	the	modern	
age,	an	argument	not	particularly	uncommon	in	a	time	when	austerity	policies	
are	increasingly	forcing	the	most	ostensibly	“useless”	field	in	the	humanities	
into	a	defensive	position	of	self-justification.	Zhang	claims	that	philosophical	
reflection	should	not	be	seen	as	completely	detached	from	the	daily	routines	
of	 people	 in	 their	 everyday	 comings	 and	goings,	 but	 continues	 to	 have	 its	
place	next	to,	and	in	a	sense	also	inside	of,	the	more	pedestrian	considerati-
ons	dominating	life	in	contemporary	society.	Still,	one	can	easily	imagine	the	
passage	quoted	above	being	used	in	support	of	claims	of	an	essential	cultural	
continuity	obscured	by	a	merely	apparent	homogenization	of	the	human	life-
world	brought	on	by	globalization.	The	 idea	 that	China	and	 its	 inhabitants	
have	not	become	less	Chinese	as	a	result	of	rapid	modernization	and	the	rise	
of	China	as	an	economic	and	geopolitical	power,	is	very	widespread	and	need	
not	in	itself	necessarily	be	problematized	or	rejected	as	ideological.2	It	is	ob-
vious	that	globalization	has	not	led	to	a	cultural	and	social	homogeneity	of	
communities	worldwide,	but	rather	constitutes	one	of	the	main	factors	con-
tributing	to	the	proliferation	of	affirmations	of	cultural	identity,	affirmations	
which	in	turn	become	a	constitutive	element	of	the	discourse	on	globalization.	
Marshall	Berman	rightly	points	out	that
“modern	environments	and	experiences	cut	across	all	boundaries	of	geography	and	ethnicity,	of	
class	and	nationality,	of	religion	and	ideology:	in	this	sense,	modernity	can	be	said	to	unite	all	
mankind.	But	it	is	a	paradoxical	unity,	a	unity	of	disunity:	it	pours	us	all	into	a	maelstrom	of	per-
petual	disintegration	and	renewal,	of	struggle	and	contradiction,	of	ambiguity	and	anguish.”3
In	many	respects,	the	culturalist	paradigm	that	often	informs	popular	and	aca-
demic	literature	on	the	“rise	of	China”	and	the	emergence	of	a	distinctly	Chi-
nese	form	of	modernity	misses	this	paradox	and	as	a	result	has	remained	con-
ceptually	underdeveloped	and	internally	conflicted.	Attacks	on	Eurocentric,	
teleological	views	of	socio-historical	development	often	end	up	formally	re-
producing	the	very	vices	of	the	discourse	they	attack,	albeit	in	a	“Sinocentric”	
form.4	The	turn	towards	culture	as	a	privileged	marker	of	identity	and	a	site	of	
contestation	against	the	hegemony	of	Euro-American	conceptions	of	modernity,	a	
turn	propelled	and	accelerated	by	postcolonial	and	postmodern	approaches,	must	
confront	the	paradoxical	fact	that	the	very	notion	of	“culture”	first	took	shape	in	
Western	societies	as	a	discursive	reaction	against	the	structural	transformations	
resulting	from	modernization.5	The	now	rather	commonplace	assumption	that	the	
world	can	be	divided	into	a	number	of	distinct	“cultures”	or	“civilizations”	and	
corresponding	“worldviews”6	became	more	probable	not	in	the	least	because	of	
the	 increasing	 knowledge	 that,	 to	 put	 it	 in	 the	 language	 of	 theology,	God	had	
hidden	the	unity	of	creation	from	his	creatures,	even	if	the	latter	were	privileged	
by	virtue	of	possessing	“clear	and	distinct	ideas”	(Descartes).	It	is	worth	noting	
that	 a	 confrontation	with	 the	 empirical	 diversity	 of	 opinions,	 convictions,	 and	
customs	already	constituted	a	factual	background	for	the	Cartesian	methodology	
of	doubt.7	Explorers,	colonialists,	and	missionaries	(later	followed	by	anthropolo-
gists	and	ethnologists)	discovered	and	conquered	“new	worlds”	and	were	con-
fronted	with	radical	differences	in	ways	of	life	and	thought	which	could	not	be	
so	easily	rendered	the	same	through	the	performative	procedure	of	name-giving	
which	was	assumed	to	accompany	or	even	coincide	with	creation	in	the	Judeo-
Christian	tradition	(“fiat lux et lux fuit”).8	The	concept	of	culture	only	acquired	
its	current	prominence	after	the	forces	of	imperialism	and	colonialism	had	spread	
new	“scientific”	methods	and	semantics	for	dividing,	comparing,	classifying,	and	
conceptually	controlling	the	radical	differences	in	forms	of	existence,	life-worlds,	
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and	ways	of	thinking	found	across	the	conquered	globe.9	That	the	particularity 
of	 communities	 and	modes	 of	 existence	 came	 to	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
universalized	concept	of	culture	shows	that	the	latter	is	a	fundamentally	dialecti-
cal	concept.	This	leads	to	the	paradox	that	discourse	on	culture	always	generates	
unity	(of	a	certain	community)	as well as difference	(of	one	community	vis-à-vis	
another).	 I	 proceed	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 very	 question	 as	 to	whether	
or	not	what	the	sociologist	Niklas	Luhmann	called	societal	“self-descriptions”10	
(of	which	“culture”	is	but	one	example)	are	the	specific	property	of	a	particular	
cultural	community,	and	can	thus	be	characterized	as	part	of	a	reflexive	unity	al-
lowing	one	to	speak	of	self-descriptions	in	the	first	place,	is	already	included	in	
the	broader	question	of	modernity,	a	question	that	can	accommodate	and	redefine	
the	problem	of	cultural	differences	between	China	and	the	West	in	a	historically	
determinate	and	meaningful	way.	In	the	context	of	his	study	on	the	changes	in	
bodily	practices	marking	 the	“birth	of	 the	modern	world”,	 the	global	historian	
C.A.	Bayly	introduces	an	instructive	distinction	between	homogenization on	the	
one	hand	and	standardization or	uniformization on	the	other.11	In	simple	terms,	
which	readers	of	Hegel	will	recognize	as	at	the	same	time	highly	“speculative”,	
homogenization	and	standardization/uniformization	denote	 two	different	 forms	
of	identity.	The	movement	of	globalization	propelled	by	Western	imperialism	and	
the	global	spread	of	the	capitalist	economy	almost	never	resulted	in	a	straightfor-
ward	process	of	Westernization	through	which	the	West	could	freely,	as	Marx	and	
Engels	wrote	concerning	the	bourgeoisie,	“create	a	world	in	its	own	image”.12	As	
is	still	obvious	today,	globalization	did	not	lead	to	the	whole	world	becoming	the	
2
For	a	comprehensive	study	on	the	“Confucian	
revival”	 in	contemporary	China	on	the	 level	
of	 everyday	 customs,	 beliefs,	 and	 practices,	
see	Sébastien	Billioud	and	Joël	Thoraval,	Le 
sage et le peuple: le renouveau confucéen en 
Chine,	Paris:	CNRS,	2014.
3
Marshall	Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into 
Air. The Experience of Modernity,	New	York:	
Penguin	Books,	1988,	p.	15.
4
For	two	notable	examples,	see	Martin	Jacques,	
When China Rules the World: the End of the 
Western World and the Birth of a New Glo­
bal Order,	London:	Penguin	Books,	2012	and	
Zhang	Weiwei,	 The China Wave: Rise of a 
Civilizational State,	Hackensack:	World	Cen-
tury	Publishing	Company,	2012.
5
Niklas	 Luhmann,	 Theories of Distinction: 
Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity,	
Stanford	 (Cal.):	 Stanford	 University	 Press,	
2002,	p.	38.
6
See	 David	 K.	 Naugle,	Worldview. The His­
tory of a Concept,	Grand	Rapids	(Michigan):	
William	 B.	 Eerdmans	 Publishing	 Company,	
2002.
7
See	Franklin	Perkins,	“Wandering	and/or	Be-
ing	 at	 Home”,	 in	 Landscape and Traveling 
East and West: a Philosophical Journey,	edi-
ted	 by	Hans-Georg	Moeller	 and	Andrew	K.	
Whitehead,	London	and	New	York:	Blooms-
bury,	2014,	pp.	24–26
	 8
Interesting	examples	can	be	found	throughout	
the	account	of	the	conquest	of	Mexico	(“ori-
ginally”	a	name	of	one	of	the	states	of	“New	
Spain”)	by	Cortés	written	by	the	latter’s	fel-
low	 conquistador	 Bernal	 Díaz	 del	 Castillo	
(1492–1581), The Conquest of New Spain,	
London:	Penguin	Books,	1963.
	 9
See	 Immanuel	 Wallerstein,	 World­System 
Analysis. An Introduction,	Durham	and	Lon-
don:	Duke	University	Press,	2004,	pp.	7–9.
10
See	Niklas	Luhmann,	Theory of Society, Vol­
ume 2,	 Stanford:	 Stanford	University	 Press,	
2013,	pp.	167–349.
11
See	 C.A.	 Bayly,	 The Birth of the Modern 
World, 1780–1914,	Malden:	Blackwell,	2004,	
pp.	12–21.
12
Karl	 Marx	 and	 Friedrich	 Engels,	Manifesto 
of the Communist Party,	[1848]	https://www.
marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/com-
munist-manifesto/ch01.htm.
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same	in	the	sense	of	tending	towards	a	resultative	state	of	sameness	with	determi-
nate	and	fixed	characteristics	(since,	for	example,	differences	in	customs	of	dress	
continued	to	persists	despite	the	global	attraction	of	Western	fashion),	but	rather	in	
a	formal	process of	becoming-the-same,	often	if	not	always	regulated	through	the	
new	medium	of	the	nation-state.	Bayly	notes	that	nation-states	both	East	and	West	
increasingly	started	to	impose	standardized	vestimentary	codes	and	uniform	rules	
for	name-giving,	without	necessarily	abandoning	traditional	(“non-Western”)	ele-
ments	and	customs.	In	other	words,	differences	between	culturally	distinct	(or	rath-
er,	distinguished)	societies	could	coexist	with	and	were	actually	linked	to	the	active	
eradication	of	differences	within these	societies	themselves	(for	example	through	
the	creation	of	national	languages	to	the	detriment	of	local	or	regional	“dialects”).	
As	opposed	to	clear-cut	homogenization (“Westernization”),	social	uniformization	
thus	denotes	the	creation	of	identities	on	a	formal	level,	allowing	for	the	possibil-
ity	 of	 different	 results	 in	 the	 concrete	 life-worlds	 in	 question.	These	 results	 are	
nevertheless	arrived	at	through	the	same	or	at	least	highly	comparable	procedures	
of	establishing	uniformity.	A	more	complete	account	of	this	process	could	be	de-
veloped	by	drawing	on	Niklas	Luhmann’s	crucial	insight	that	“[t]he	modernity	of	
society	lies	not in its characteristics but in its forms”.13	Bearing	in	mind	the	histori-
cal	specificity	of	the	idea	of	“culture”,	this	would	imply	that	affirmations	of	cultural	
identity	remain	fundamentally	caught	up	in	what	Bayly	calls	processes	of	uniformi-
zation,	or	in	other	words,	that	difference	remains	hierarchically	subordinated	to	an	
identity	which	is	not	of	a	conceptual	but	of	a	socio-historical	origin.
Clearly,	 there	are	 larger	 issues	at	 stake	 in	assumptions	of	essential	cultural	
continuity	hidden	beneath	 the	homogenization	of	 the	world	on	 the	 level	of	
appearance.	As	I	will	indicate	below,	the	very	distinction	between	“essence”	
and	“appearance”	is	not	without	philosophical	presuppositions	and	historical	
determinations	 of	 its	 own.	At	 the	 risk	 of	 unfairly	 overburdening	 the	 short	
passage	from	the	work	of	Zhang	Shiying	which	I	quoted	at	the	beginning	of	
my	article	with	a	misplaced	exegetical	diligence,	I	would	like	to	take	it	as	a	
starting	point	for	further	reflecting	on	the	relation	between	culture,	tradition,	
and	modernity	in	the	case	of	modern	Confucian	philosophy.	My	impression	
that	Zhang’s	text	can	be	used	in	this	way	is	reinforced	by	the	image	it	presents	
of	an	accomplished	businessman	standing	on	the	top	floor	(a	clear	indication	
of	his	success)	of	what	is	currently	(though	probably	not	for	long)	the	seventh	
largest	skyscraper	in	mainland	China,	while	reciting	a	well-known	1300-year-
old	poem.	By	reciting	these	famous	Tang-dynasty	verses	that	describe	a	sense	
of	historical	 isolation	 from	both	past	and	 future	generations,	 the	poetically	
minded	entrepreneur	 in	Zhang’s	 example	 is	paradoxically	presented	as	be-
coming	enabled	to	connect	with	the	past	and	with	tradition	through	a	sense	
of	 connectedness	with	 a	 certain	 tradition	 of	disconnectedness.	Despite	 the	
historical	distance	between	the	author	of	the	ballad	“On	Climbing	Youzhou	
Tower”	(Deng Youzhou tai ge)	and	 the	businessman	on	 top	of	 the	88-story	
“Tower	of	Golden	Prosperity”14	 in	 the	glitzy	 financial	district	of	Shanghai	
reciting	this	poem,	the	textual	parallelism	between	the	two	towers	in	Zhang’s	
text	suggests	that	the	feeling	of	being	cut	off	from	the	past	is	the	same	in	both	
cases.	There	is	an	implicit	assumption	of	a	“continuity	of	discontinuity”,	ma-
nifesting	itself	in	a	shared	sense	of	historical	isolation.	Both	the	setting	and	
the	material	features	of	the	tower	may	have	changed,	but	the	time	permeating	
it	would	appear	to	be	part	of	the	same	historical	continuum,	close	to	an	eter-
nal	present	which	is	forever	equidistant	to	both	past	and	future.	Furthermore,	
Zhang’s	contrastive	juxtaposition	of	a	focus	on	“concrete	things”	and	consi-
derations	of	“problems	of	a	general	nature”	has	a	clear	temporal	dimension:	
in	our	day-to-day	activities,	we	function	as	pragmatic	agents	governed	by	a	
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purposive	rationality in	which	the	immediate	interests	of	the	present	are	most	
relevant	and	imposing.	In	contrast	to	this	calculative-rational	level,	the	mea-
ningful	dimension	of	life	is	marked	by	the	possibility	of	relating	to	questions	
of	a	more	durable	and	recurring	nature,	the	“eternal”	questions	of	a	philosop­
hia perennis.	The	underlying	idea	seems	to	be	that	it	is	the	latter	dimension	of	
an	eternal	recurrence	which	constitutes	a	horizon	of	meaning,	as	opposed	to	
inescapable	but	ultimately	empty	concerns	about	immediate	usefulness.	Mo-
reover,	the	“eternal”	would	seem	to	have	a	privileged	relation	with	the	past 
and	with	tradition:	it	is	by	connecting	with	the	past	that	the	eternal	becomes	
accessible	and	tangible	as	something	outlasting	and	surpassing	the	constraints	
of	the	fleeting	time	in	which	it	can	be	accessed	by	a	particular	individual.	In	
this	way,	the	present	is	saved	from	becoming	an	atomized	instance	condemned	
to	remain	forever	confined	to	itself	in	a	state	of	detached	suspension	precisely	
because	it	is	part	of	a	history	and	of	a	tradition	of	such	a	suspension.
A	few	comments	are	called	for	here.	In	a	sense,	change	and	discontinuity	and	
the	concomitant	acts	of	adaptation	and	transformation	are	integral	and	con-
stitutive	parts	of	any	tradition. As	Luhmann	once	put	it	formulaically:	“what	
is	not	utilized	is	stable	and,	by	contrast,	what	 is	utilized	is	not	stable.”15	A	
perceived	necessity	to	ward	off	the	possibility	of	oblivion	might	well	be	said	
to	be	intrinsic	to	historical	consciousness	as	such.	Perhaps	it	is	even	difficult	
to	conceive	of	time	as	such	without	appealing	to	the	notion	of	the	discontinu-
ous.16	Anyone	even	remotely	familiar	with	classical	Chinese	texts	knows	how	
many	of	them	(not	only	philosophical	works,	but	also	for	example	medical	
treatises)	start	with	a	dramatic	observation	of	 the	decline	of	 the	Way	(dao)	
and	 of	 a	 rupture	 in	 the	 succession	 of	 the	Way	 (daotong)	 that	 should	 keep	
the	world	from	falling	into	a	seemingly	ever-imminent	disorder.	In	a	famous	
essay	entitled	On the Original Way	(Yuandao)	by	the	Tang-dynasty	poet	and	
scholar	Han	Yu	(768–824),	we	find	Han	bemoaning	the	degeneration	of	the	
Confucian	principles	of	personal	cultivation	and	political	governance	in	the	
following	memorable	manner:
“The	Zhou	dynasty	declined	and	Confucius	passed	away.	In	the	period	that	followed,	there	was	
the	burning	of	the	books	in	the	Qin	dynasty	(221–206	B.C.E.),	Daoism	in	the	Han	dynasty	(206	
B.C.E.–220	c.e.),	and	Buddhism	in	the	Jin	(265–420	C.E.),	Wei	(386–549),	Liang	(502–57),	and	
Sui	(589–617)	dynasties;	those	who	talked	about	the	Way,	Virtue,	benevolence,	and	righteous-
ness	either	followed	the	teachings	of	Yang	Zhu	or	Mozi	or	accepted	the	doctrines	of	Laozi	or	
the	Buddha.	Those	who	accepted	these	teachings	had	to	reject	Confucianism.	They	regarded	the	
leaders	of	these	schools	as	their	lords	and	Confucius	as	a	slave;	they	adhered	to	the	new	and	
vilified	the	old.	Is	it	not	sad!	Those	living	in	later	ages	who	want	to	learn	about	the	Way,	Virtue,	
benevolence,	and	righteousness–from	whom	can	they	hear	such	things?”17
13
Niklas	Luhmann,	Theory of Society,	Volume 
1,	Stanford	(Cal.):	Stanford	University	Press,	
2012,	p.	95.	Emphasis	added.
14
Incidentally,	 the	 Jin	Mao	 (literally,	 “Golden	
Prosperity”)	 tower	 is	 itself	 an	 architectural	
expression	 of	 a	 quest	 for	 continuity.	 The	
American	architect	Adrian	D.	Smith	(the	man	
behind	 the	Burj	Khalifa	 in	Dubai)	who	was	
commissioned	 to	 design	 the	 building	 mod-
eled	 it	 after	 the	 iconic	 East-Asian	 pagoda.	
See	 Thomas	 J.	 Campanella,	 The Concrete 
Dragon: China’s Urban Revolution and What 
it Means for the World.	Princeton:	Princeton	
Architectural	Press,	2008,	pp.	84–86.
15
Niklas	 Luhmann,	 A Systems Theory of Re­
ligion,	 Stanford	 (Cal.):	 Stanford	 University	
Press,	2013,	pp.	11–12.
16
See	Gaston	Bachelard,	L’intuition de l’instant,	
Paris:	Stock,	1992.
17
Translation	 quoted	 from	 Philip	 J.	 Ivanhoe,	
On Ethics and History: Essays and Letters of 
Zhang Xuecheng, Stanford	 (Cal.):	 Stanford	
University	Press,	2009,	p.	134.
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The	 twentieth	 century	 Confucian	 philosopher	 Mou	 Zongsan	 (1909–1995)	
enumerates	roughly	the	same	foes	of	Confucianism	we	already	encountered	
in	the	above	passage	by	Han	Yu	to	describe	the	disastrous	fate	he	considers	the	
Confucian	tradition	to	have	suffered	at	the	hands	of	Communist	iconoclasm	in	
a	text	from	1951	with	the	revealing	title,	“Buddha,	Laozi,	Shen	[Buhai],	Han	
[Feizi],	and	the	Communist	Party”	(Fo Lao Shen Han yu gongdang).18	From	
the	title	of	Mou’s	essay,	it	would	appear	that	the	communists	are	nothing	but	a	
modern	day	version	of	the	Buddhists,	Daoists	and	Legalists	(Shen	Buhai	and	
Han	Feizi)	already	condemned	by	Han	in	his	Yuandao as	having	caused	peo-
ple	to	deviate	from	the	right	Way.	The	takeover	of	China	by	revolutionary	Co-
mmunism	and	the	establishment	of	the	People’s	Republic	in	1949	would	thus	
seem	to	be	on	a	par	with	and	of	essentially	the	same	nature	as	the	influence	
exerted	by	these	doctrines	in	imperial	China,	which	Han	saw	as	having	lead	to	
a	disastrous	corruption	of	the	Confucian	order,	the	latter	being	the	necessary	
condition	for	a	just	and	righteous	governance	of	the	empire.	The	“utilitaria-
nist”	ideas	of	Mozi	(470–391	BCE)	and	the	“hedonist”	doctrines	of	Yang	Zhu	
(440–360	BCE),	which	Mou	Zongsan	often	added	 to	his	 list	of	premodern	
communists	on	other	occasions,	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	or	discussed	in	
the	1951	essay.	Mou’s	usual	suspect	was	the	China’s	first	(Legalist-inspired)	
dynasty,	the	Qin	(221–206	BCE),	which	according	to	the	Confucian	tradition	
at	least	ordered	the	“burning	of	the	classics	and	the	burying	of	Confucian	sc-
holars”	(fenshu kengru)	in	order	to	impose	its	authority	and	suppress	dissent.	
The	association	between	Communism	and	Legalism	 is	perhaps	not	 so	 sur-
prising	seeing	how	Mao	Zedong	reputedly	liked	to	compare	himself	with	the	
first	Chinese	emperor,	the	latter	having	already	been	described	by	Bertrand	
Russell	after	his	visit	to	China	as	“something	of	a	Bolshevik”.19	Nowadays,	
the	idea	that	there	has	always	been	a	tradition	of	anti-traditionalism	and	even	
a	radical	form	of	iconoclasm	in	China	has	become	fairly	standard	in	contem-
porary	Confucian	discourse.	However,	a	short	look	at	the	opening	passage	of	
Mou’s	text	will	suffice	to	make	it	clear	that	there	are	important	differences	
between	these	two	rhetorically	unifiable	discontinuities:
“The	appearance	of	 the	Communist	Party	 in	China	was	certainly	not	 the	 result	of	economic	
problems.	Even	the	appearance	of	that	sinister	and	malicious	thought	of	Marx	in	Europe	was	
in	no	way	the	result	of	economic	issues	[…]	Its	appearance	was	purely	a	problem	of	thought,	a	
problem	of	culture	and	a	problem	of	the	spirit	of	our	age.	Other	external	conditions	[waibu de 
tiaojian]	–	political	and	economical	ones	–	all	served	as	a	pretext.	[But]	this	pretext	certainly	
cannot	hide	what	its	[true]	substance	is.	I	claim	that	communism	is	a	great	demon	that	is	evident-
ly	not	easy	to	oppose.	I	further	claim	that	it	is	a	universal	heterodox	school,	a	heresy	of	“pure	
negation”.	What	is	meant	by	“universal”	is	the	following:	it	comes	forth	from	the	darkest	side	
of	the	human	temperament.	This	aspect	is	in	no	way	limited	to	a	certain	race,	but	is	universally	
present	in	the	entire	human	race.	Therefore,	its	appearance	constitutes	a	universal	heterodoxy	
within	[the	whole	of]	humanity.	What	is	meant	by	“pure	negation”	is	the	following:	all	negations	
of	human	nature,	individuality,	the	level	of	values,	the	world	of	the	human	personality	and	of	
cultural	ideals	are	pure	negations.	In	China,	the	old	heterodox	schools	were	those	of	Buddhism,	
Daoism	and	of	[the	Legalists]	Shen	[Buhai]	and	Han	[Feizi];	nowadays	we	have	the	Communist	
Party.”20
What	is	probably	most	striking	about	this	text	is	the	universalist	thrust	behind	
Mou	Zongsan’s	rejection	of	what	he	on	another	occasion	called	the	“catas-
trophe	of	ideas”	(guannian de zaihai).21	For	him,	communism	is	a	“universal	
heterodoxy”	that	not	only	goes	against	the	putative	essence	or	“spirit”	of	Chi-
nese	culture	(in	his	view,	of	course,	Confucianism),	but	also	runs	counter	to	
the	very	notion	of	culture	as	such.	As	is	already	evident	from	the	first	sentence	
of	this	passage,	Mou’s	criticism	of	communism	entails	an	uncompromising	
rejection	 of	 its	main	 theoretical	 “heresy”,	 namely	 the	 historical	materialist	
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belief	that	it	is	(ultimately)	the	material,	economic	conditions	of	existence	as	
a	“base”	which	determine	the	“superstructure”	of	a	society’s	ideas	and	beliefs.	
Mou	degrades	the	base	to	the	status	of	“external	conditions”	of	secondary	im-
portance	and	goes	on	to	ascribe	a	self-sufficiency	and	a	performative	capacity	
to	the	level	of	ideas	and	values	comparable	to	that	of	the	forces	and	relations	of	
production	in	orthodox	Marxism.	Mou	Zongsan	shared	the	belief	with	many	
of	his	fellow	Confucian	philosophers	that	the	ordeal	of	modern	China	had	its	
origin	in	a	profound	cultural	crisis,	and	that	only	cultural	renewal	in	the	form	
of	a	reinvention	of	the	Confucian	tradition	could	provide	a	way	out.	His	em-
phasis	on	the	“pure	negativity”	of	the	communist	idea	is	developed	further	on	
in	the	text	in	order	to	distinguish	communism	from	the	“negating”	aspects	of	
Buddhism	and	Daoism,	which	were,	Mou	claims,	still	integrated	in	a	broader	
spiritual	practice	and	did	not	constitute	a	form	of	“positive	destruction”	af-
fecting	the	totality	of	the	subjective	and	objective	world.	He	makes	the	impor-
tant	qualification	that	the	difference	between	Buddhist/Daoist	and	communist	
negation	is	one	of	a	relative	negation	functioning	in	a	broader	spiritual	project	
of	self-cultivation	aimed	at	a	laudable	detachment	from	the	world	on	the	one	
hand,	and	an	absolute,	pure	and	senseless	negation	that	cannot	be	integrated	
into	any	overarching	goal	on	the	other.	In	other	words,	detachment	from	indi-
vidual	desires	and	external,	social	constraints	in	Buddhist	and	Daoist	spiritual	
practice	did	not	entail	a	destructive	negation	of	all	“values”	as	was	the	case	
in	communism.22 Mou’s	negative	attitude	towards	Daoism	and	Buddhism	ex-
pressed	in	this	rhetoric	of	“guilt	by	association”	was	probably	mainly	inspired	
by	polemical	intentions.	In	any	case,	it	is	clear	that	his	primary	targets	were	
communism	and	the	historical	materialism	of	Karl	Marx,	and	not	the	teach-
ings	of	Laozi	or	the	Buddha.	In	his	“Refutation	of	the	Communist	Treatise on 
Contradiction”	 (Pi gongchanzhuyizhe de ‘Maodun lun’)	 from	195223,	Mou	
Zongsan	further	 identifies	the	communist	revolution	as	a	complete	negation	
of	anything	outside	of	the	inconstant	flux	of	material	constituents,	which	are	
only	negatively	united	through	their	shared	fate	of	being	ephemeral	and	un-
substantial.	He	adds	that	such	a	form	of	negation	cannot	even	be	wielded	and	
put	to	good	use	as	a	political	strategy	of	domination,	because	it	must	necessar-
ily	end	up	affecting	the	communists	themselves:	“Actually”,	Mou	writes,	“the	
communist	 revolution	 itself	 is	 nothing	but	 a	nihilist	 process	of	 destruction	
and	self-destruction	based	on	their	complete	nihilism.	Their self-preservation 
is really nothing but the preservation of their own self-destruction.”24	 For	
Mou,	the	fundamental	mistake	of	communist	materialism	consists	in	its	fatal	
18
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disregard	for	the	permanent	element	that	conditions	change	and	is	outside	of	
and	immune	to	change:	it	only	knows	the	“changing	Way”	(biandao),	but	can-
not	grasp	the	“constant	Way”	(hengdao).25	Still,	the	crucial	differences	Mou	
discerns	between	Buddhist	or	Daoist	and	communist	strategies	of	negation	
do	not	cause	him	to	abandon	the	idea	that	Chinese	communism	is	part	of	a	
historically	continuous	challenge	to	Confucianism,	and	that	the	discontinuity	
with	tradition	constituted	by	communism	can	be	placed	in	a	more	ancient	and	
permanent	historical	continuum.	As	I	will	 further	 indicate	 in	what	 follows,	
Mou	Zongsan’s	arguments	for	a	continuity	which	can	only	be	described	in	the	
form	of	a	paradox	(time	as	a	“self-preservation	of	destruction”	or	“destruc-
tion	of	self-preservation”),	already	involve	the	implicit	acknowledgment	of	a	
series	of	arguably	very	modern	ideas	concerning	the	nature	of	historical	time	
that	differ	considerably	from	traditional	conceptions.
In	other	instances	it	might	be	more	difficult	to	distinguish	between	“traditio-
nal”	and	“modern”	assertions	of	discontinuity,	especially	when	culturally	tran-
smitted	expressions	of	a	sense	of	rupture	are	invoked	by	present	day	writers	to	
express	the	“same”	feeling	of	dislocation	in	time.	It	is	of	course	impossible	to	
make	such	a	distinction	without	stepping	outside	of	discourse	and	relating	a	
given	semantics	of	temporal	change	to	the	socio-historical	context	in	which	it	
is	situated	and	employed.	By	doing	so,	one	could	argue	that	two	statements	of	
an	equally	dramatic	tone	and	stature	drawing	on	a	common	cultural	vocabulary	
can	be	the	expressions	of	two	significantly	different	forms	of	discontinuity.	
This	implies	that	it	is	possible	to	draw	a	heuristically	meaningful	distinction	
between	the	change	and	discontinuity	internal	to	any	tradition	on	the	one	hand	
and	 the	dynamic	underlying	and	driving	 transformations	effectuated	 in	 the	
face	of	modernity	on	the	other.	One	would	thus	have	to	recognize	a	minimal	
difference	between	the	state	described	by	Hamlet’s	observation	that	“the	time	
is	out	of	joint”,	a	condition	which	is	in	a	sense	intrinsic	to	any	time	and	to	time	
as	such26,	and	the	being	“out	of	joint”	of	this	“out-of-jointness”	itself.	In	the	
case	of	China,	it	is	clear	that	the	failed	attempts	to	reform	and	reconfigure	the	
Chinese	empire	as	“All-under-Heaven”	(tianxia)	within	the	coordinates	of	the	
modern	nation-state	(guojia) after	the	two	Opium	Wars	–	eventually	leading	
to	the	abolishment	of	traditional	institutions	such	as	the	examination	system	
and	the	fall	of	the	Qing	dynasty	in	1911	–	constituted	a	historical	break	that	
was	not	so	easy	to	incorporate	into	established	ways	of	dealing	with	disconti-
nuity.27	In	the	Chinese	context,	a	whole	host	of	established	concepts	such	as	
“heavenly	principle”	(tianli),	“group”	(qun),	“the	investigation	of	things	and	
the	extension	of	knowledge”	(gewu zhizhi)	were	reinterpreted	in	function	of,	
and	often	abandoned	for,	modern	concepts	such	as	“truth”	(zhenli),	“society”	
(shehui),	and	“science”	(kexue).28	The	process	through	which	the	novel	cate-
gory	of	“philosophy”	(zhexue)	was	used	to	designate	and	reaffirm	traditional	
forms	of	 knowledge	 and	practice	 such	 as	Confucianism	and	Buddhism	by	
inscribing	 them	into	 the	universal	and	 transhistorical	category	of	philosop-
hical	thought	was	equally	wrought	with	the	tension	between	continuity	and	
discontinuity.29	However,	Joseph	Levenson’s	idea	that	Western	influence	ma-
naged	to	change	the	entire	language	of	China,	whereas	concepts	derived	from	
the	Chinese	tradition	only	managed	to	“enrich”	Western	(artistic,	conceptual)	
vocabulary does	not	provide	a	sufficiently	nuanced	and	complex	account	of	
this	transition.30	The	research	carried	out	by	Reinhart	Koselleck	has	shown	
that	Western	European	societies	were	as	much	affected	by	modernization	as	
the	areas	of	 the	world	 they	sought	 to	 subjugate	and	control	politically	and	
economically,	and	that	the	semantics	available	for	describing	time	and	socio-
historical	change	consequentially	underwent	dramatic	changes	as	well.31	The	
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seminal	work	of	the	Marxist	theorist	Moishe	Postone	allows	one	to	go	on	to	
relate	such	semantic	changes	to	a	structural	 transformation	in	the	nature	of	
time	resulting	from	the	dynamic	of	capitalism	as	a	mode	of	production	gro-
unded	in	abstract	time.32	Needless	to	say,	this	highly	complex	problem	cannot	
be	adequately	discussed	or	even	outlined	in	the	space	of	this	short	article.33	
Suffice	 it	 to	 note	 here	 that	 the	 historical	 distinction	 between	 tradition	 and	
modernity	offers	a	much	broader	and	much	more	embracive	perspective	than	
essentialistic	attempts	to	demarcate	the	boundaries	between	China	and	West	
in	terms	of	putative	cultural	“characteristics”	(tese).
2. New Confucianism, May Fourth, 
  and the concept of Spirit
In	modern	Chinese	intellectual	history,	the	irreversible	but	complexly	medi-
ated	break	between	tradition	and	modernity	is	symbolized	the	New	Culture	
Movement	(xin wenhua yundong),	a	term	often	used	interchangeably	with	the	
May	Fourth	Movement	(wusi yundong).	As	a	broad	designation,	the	New	Cul-
ture	or	May	Fourth	Movement	refers	to	the	intellectual	reverberations	of	the	
socio-political	turmoil	in	China	in	the	decades	leading	up	to	and	following	the	
collapse	of	the	empire,	the	disintegration	of	its	whole	institutional	structure,	
and	the	founding	of	the	Republic	of	China	in	1912.	Of	course,	reflections	on	
and	demands	for	radical	social	change	were	not	simply	aloof	exercises	in	the-
orizing,	but	were	fundamentally	bound	up	with	the	new	political	projects	of	
Chinese	communism,	anarchism,	liberalism,	and	modern	“conservatism”.	The	
beginning	of	this	intellectual	and	political	movement	attacking	the	normative	
legitimacy	of	established	practices,	beliefs,	customs,	interpersonal	relations,	
ideas,	and	institutions,	is	routinely	marked	by	the	launch	of	the	journal	New 
Youth	(Xin qingnian,	La Jeunesse)	in	Shanghai	in	1915.	New Youth soon	beca-
me	a	forum	for	intellectual	debate	in	which	some	of	the	most	famous	literary	
and	theoretical	texts	associated	with	May	Fourth	would	appear.	In	one	of	the	
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perhaps	somewhat	lesser	known	pieces	published	in	this	renowned	periodical,	
the strong	sense	of	historical	discontinuity	 that	pervaded	and	animated	 the	
late	Qing	and	early	Republican	period	is	cogently	expressed	in	a	simple	sen-
tence	by	a	certain	Wang	Shuqian.	The	sentence	in	question	appears	in	an	es-
say	entitled	“The	Problem	of	the	New	and	the	Old”	(Xinjiu wenti),	published	
in	the	very	first	issue	of	New Youth:	“There	is	not	a	single	thing	or	matter”,	
Wang	wrote,	“that	does	not	manifest	itself	in	the	two	aspects	of	new	and	old”	
(wu wu wu shi bu cheng xin jiu zhi er xiang).34	A	possible	interpretation	of	this	
short	but	suggestive	phrase	would	be	that	socio-historical	change	has	effecti-
vely	split	every	phenomenon	subject	to	historical	time	into	two	non-identical	
and	not	immediately	reconcilable	aspects.	In	ontological	terms,	the	problem	
of	modernity	forces	questions	concerning	difference	and	identity	to	be	related	
to	discontinuity	and	continuity	in	time,	a	move	which	in	effect	presupposes	
deontologizing	 them.	A	 historically	 sensitive	 analysis	must	 leave	 open	 the	
possibility	that	“Being”	is	not	what	it	used	to	be.	Interestingly	enough,	Wang	
used	the	very	classical	concept	of	xiang to	describe	this	temporal	bifurcation	
distinctive	 of	modernity:	 the	 two	 “images”	 or	 “aspects”	 of	 the	Way	 (dao)	
are	none	other	than	the	cosmic	polarity	of	yin	and	yang,	which	engender	the	
myriad	things	(wanwu)	through	their	unceasing	intermingling	and	interaction.	
Wang’s	phrase	offers	yet	another	example	of	how	traditional	semantics	can	
be	used	to	express	a	deeply	modern	experience.	However,	in	Wang’s	text,	the	
age-old polarity	 of	 yin and	 yang	 has	 become	 fundamentally	 temporalized,	
whereas	time	was	but	one	of	the	possible	dimensions	of	these	two	aspects	of	
the	cosmological	and	political	order.	From	the	rest	of	Wang	Shuqian’s	text,	
it	is	all	too	clear	that	he	saw	this	temporal	split	as	inevitable	and	irreversible.	
His	iconoclast	stance	expressed	itself	in	an	unconditional	rejection	of	the	old	
in	favor	of	the	new.	Such	an	attitude	is	also	exemplified	by	the	founder	of	New 
Youth and	pioneer	of	Chinese	communism	Chen	Duxiu	(1879–1942),	in	his	
“Treatise	on	the	Destruction	of	Idols”	(Ouxiang pohuai lun) from	1918.	But	
even	Chen’s	essay,	for	all	its	radical	and	uncompromising	condemnation	of	
the	“idols”	of	tradition,	reveals	that	the	attitude	of	modern	Chinese	intellectu-
als	was	a	lot	more	complicated	than	can	be	captured	by	a	simplistic	opposition	
between	 iconoclasm	and	 traditionalism.	This	much	at	 least	 is	suggested	by	
the	fact	that	Chen	lists	the	modern	state	alongside	all	the	great	religions	of	the	
world	as	an	idol	that	needs	to	be	destroyed	in	order	to	save	the	Chinese	nation	
from	destruction.	Conversely,	a	number	of	prominent	“conservative”	intellec-
tuals	affiliated	with	the	promotion	of	“national	essence”	(guocui)	in	late	Qing	
and	early	Republican	China	who	are	usually	portrayed	as	the	most	staunch	
traditionalists	and	reactionaries,	saw	no	problem	in	presenting	“revolution	as	
restoration”.35	From	the	fact	 that	 the	attack	on	“Confucian	feudalism”	spe-
arheaded	by	the	revolutionary,	anarchist,	and	liberal	thinkers	at	the	forefront	
of	the	movement	for	a	new	culture	led	to	the	paradoxical	embrace	of	tradi-
tionally	non-canonical	schools	of	thought	opposed	to	Confucian	ideals	such	
as	Legalism	and	Mohism	by	iconoclast	 intellectuals,	one	can	already	glean	
something	of	the	complexity	of	the	relation	between	tradition	and	modernity	
in	modern	China.	It	also	makes	it	easier	to	understand	why	Mou	Zongsan	saw	
Legalism	and	communism	as	basically	convertible	terms.
Clearly,	 thinkers	who	wanted	 to	 reaffirm	 the	value	of	 tradition	as	 a	 “scare	
resource”36	in	the	face	of	unprecedented	structural	changes	in	history	and	in	
the	semantics	available	for	comprehending	these	changes,	were	in	no	way	fo-
reign	or	immune	to	modernization	discourses.	With	regard	to	Mou	Zongsan,	
Sébastien	Billioud	has	rightly	observed	that	the	Confucian	philosopher,	“far	
from	being	an	opponent	of	modernity,	is	also	an	heir	of	the	May	Fourth	spirit	
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and	 its	 values	 of	 science	 and	 democracy.	 In	 brief,	 he	 embraces	modernity	
while	attempting	to	articulate	it	within	a	Chinese	cultural	tradition	that	should	
not	be	thrown	into	the	dustbin	of	history.”37	 Indeed,	Mou	did	not	conceive	
of	the	relation	between	Confucianism	and	modernity	as	a	problem	of	com-
patibility	and	“adaptation”	(shiying)	but	as	one	of	“realization”	(shixian).38	
Mou’s	lifelong	friend	and	collaborator	Tang	Junyi	(1900–1978)	too	tried	to	
present	the	development	of	science	and	democracy	in	modern	China	as	the	
fulfillment	of	the	internal	requirements	of	Chinese	culture,	which	he	assumed	
to	have	always	been	affected	and	influenced	by	other	cultures	“purely	out	of	
its	inner	yearning	and	demands”39.	In	doing	so,	Tang	advocated	the	need	for	
the	Chinese	tradition	to	“realize”	science	and	a	scientific	attitude	with	very	
much	the	same	sense	of	urgency	as	unabashed	modernizers	such	as	the	liberal	
Hu	Shi	 (1891–1962),	 one	of	 the	most	pronounced	advocates	of	 “full-scale	
Westernization”	(quanpan xifanghua).	Tang	saw	this	need	as	arising	from	the	
“disorder,	irregularity	and	the	intellectual	confusion	in	the	life	of	the	Chinese	
people”,	necessitating	a	form	of	“scientific	discipline”	(kexue zhi xunlian).40	
The	concept	of	“science”	as	a	modern	form	of	knowledge	linked	to	a	specific	
type	of	 sovereignty,41	has	an	 important	political	dimension	 in	 this	context;	
connoting	order,	control	and	regularity	over	and	against	chaos,	disorder	and	
aberrance.	This	dimension	is	still	very	much	present	in	the	idea	of	“scientific	
development”	(kexue fazhan)	recently	put	forward	by	the	Hu	Jintao	admini-
stration	(2003–2012)	in	mainland	China.	The	notion	of	“anti-modern	theories	
of	modernization”	(fan xiandai de xiandaixing lilun)	coined	by	the	intellec-
tual	historian	Wang	Hui42	could	be	taken	as	a	particularly	apt	description	of	
what	came	to	be	known	as	the	movement	of	“New	Confucianism”	(xin ruxue)	
and	New	Confucian	philosophy,	of	which	Mou	and	Tang	are	two	of	the	most	
well-known	and	sophisticated	representatives.	It	stands	beyond	doubt	that	the	
origins	of	New	Confucianism	are	intricately	bound	up	with	the	attack	on	tra-
dition	symbolized	by	May	Fourth,	but	it	should	be	stressed	that	the	invocation	
and	use	of	 traditional	concepts	by	New	Confucian	thinkers	was	not	simply	
“conservative”	or	“reactionary”,	but	was	connected	to	an	alternative	“Confu-
cian”	project	of	modernization	that	often	went	hand	in	hand	with	a	notional	
critique	of	“actually	existing”	modernity.
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This	 is	 apparent	 from	modern	Confucian	 reinterpretations	of	 the	historical	
significance	of	the	May	Fourth	Movement	in	which	calls	to	“smash	the	shop	
of	Confucius	&	Sons”	(dadao Kongjia dian)	resounded	with	an	unpreceden-
ted	 intensity.	Tang	 Junyi	would	 later	 speak	of	May	Fourth	 as	 the	 emblem	
of	the	“spiritual	affliction”	(jingshen bingtong)43	of	his	own	generation	and	
the	previous	generation	of	intellectuals,	an	affliction	which	had	incapacitated	
them	to	“spiritually	direct	themselves	towards	the	internal	and	the	higher”.44	
Unlike	for	those	who	advocated	thoroughgoing	change	and	saw	themselves	
as	politically	engaged	instructors	of	the	people	who	were	fortunate	enough	to	
be	“the	first	to	know	and	the	first	to	become	enlightened”45,	for	many	traditi-
onalists,	the	May	Fourth	“enlightenment”	signified	the	unbalanced	victory	of	
what	Chen	Duxiu	had	famously	called	“Mister	Democracy”	(De xiangsheng)	
and	“Mister	Science”	(Sai xiansheng)	over	“Miss	Morality” (De guniang).	
In	its	antitraditional	May	Fourth	guise,	enlightenment	–	defined	by	Kant	as	
“man’s	 emergence	 from	his	 “self-incurred	 immaturity”46	–	would	 come	 to	
be	seen	as,	what	the	contemporary	Confucian	scholar	Tu	Wei-ming	calls	an	
“externally imposed yet self­inflicted malaise”.47	For	thinkers	who	wanted	to	
uphold	the	Confucian	tradition,	the	problem	was	not	so	much	that	“everyt-
hing	must	submit	to	criticism”,48	but	rather	that	tradition	was	no	longer	em-
ployed	to	directly	provide	the	categories	and	criteria	on	which	such	criticism	
should	in	their	view	be	based.	The	intellectual	historian	Zhang	Hao	claims	
that	“the	scope	of	[May	Fourth]	moral	iconoclasm	is	perhaps	unique	in	the	
modern	world;	no	other	historical	civilization	outside	 the	West	undergoing	
modern	transformation	has	witnessed	such	a	phoenix-like	impulse	to	see	its	
own	cultural	tradition	so	completely	neglected.”49	However,	what	is	missing	
in	Zhang’s	account	 is	a	broader	perspective	which	puts	 the	events	and	 the	
discourses	 surrounding	May	Fourth	 in	a	global	 context,	 since	very	 similar	
processes	can	be	observed	all	over	the	world	at	the	same	historical	juncture.50	
One	clear	indication	is	that	the	semantic	schemes	adopted	in	the	face	of	the	
unprecedented	 transformation	of	Chinese	 society	were,	 on	 an	 abstract	 and	
formal	 level,	not	 specifically	Chinese	at	all.	Even	among	 tradition-minded	
thinkers,	it	did	not	always	prove	so	difficult	to	interpret	the	generalized	“cul-
tural	crisis”	they	saw	around	them	as	an	intermediary	stage	in	a	larger	histo-
rical	movement,	 thereby	already	ascribing	a	certain	necessity	 to	 this	 crisis	
as	an	opportunity	for	the	“purification”	of	tradition	paving	the	way	for	the	
latter’s	 rebirth.	He	Lin	 (1902–1992),	 a	Hegel-inspired	 philosopher	who	 is	
credited	as	the	first	to	have	used	the	expression	“New	Confucianism”	with	
reference	to	himself	and	his	contemporaries,51	sounds	remarkably	similar	to	
Chen	Duxiu’s	 famous	eulogy	on	 the	purifying	effect	of	youth	and	novelty	
against	the	putrefaction	of	tradition	in	the	first	issue	of	New Youth	when	he	
writes	that	the	New	Culture	Movement	of	the	May	Fourth	period	was	an	
important	 turning	point	 for	 encouraging	 the	development	of	Confucian	
thought.	On the surface,	the	New	Culture	Movement	was	one	big	move-
ment	to	“smash	the	Confucian	shop”	and	to	overturn	Confucian	thought.	
[…]	The	greatest	contribution	of	the	New	Culture	Movement	lies	in	its	
having	destroyed	and	cleansed	away	the	petrified	elements	in	the	details	
of	the	formal	constitution	of	Confucianism	and	those	traditional	putrefied	
parts	that	fetter	individuality.52
In	a	fascinating	article	from	1953,	Mou	Zongsan	invokes	the	Romantic	poet	
Hölderlin’s	 idea	of	“the	withdrawal	of	God”,53	with	which	he	was	familiar	
through	Heidegger	(through	the	intermediary	of	Tang	Junyi),	in	an	argument	
where	the	same	logic	of	“purification”	is	mobilized	even	more	dramatically:
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“His	withdrawal	[guiji]	is	a	temporary	separation	he	establishes	between	himself	and	the	hu-
man	world.	He	wants	to	uphold	his	own	purity	and	return	to	his	own	“pure	subjectivity”	[chun 
zhutixing].	 Only	 in	 this	 way	 can	 he	 truly	 establish	 himself	 and	 uphold	 himself	 and	 avoid	
being	washed	away.	[…]	When	he	returns	to	his	own	pure	subjectivity,	then	the	cruelty	and	
ignorance	of	 the	Middle	Ages	 and	 the	vulgarity	 and	 trifling	 attitude	of	 the	modern	 age	 all	
become	a	process	of	self-destruction	on	the	side	of	the	human	world.	At	the	same	time,	the	
obstinacy	of	people	towards	God	which	causes	them	to	fall	into	darkness	and	makes	their	life	
and	their	spirit	unable	to	open	up	and	change	is	not	something	in	which	God	takes	pleasure.	
That	is	why	he	must	take	a	step	back	in	order	to	allow	the	life	and	the	mind	of	human	beings	
to	transform	itself	so	that	they	may	temper	themselves	in	this	process	of	transformation	and	
so	that	they	can	find	out	whether	they	are	able	to	become	awakened	and	free	of	delusions	to	
attain	the	region	where	they	circulate	and	interconnect	with	God	[…]	Therefore,	the	retreat	
of	God	is	not	only	that	through	which	he	purifies	himself,	but	also	that	by	which	he	cleanses	
the	human	world.”54
The	distance	between	the	ideal	(God)	and	the	real	(a	world	from	which	God	
has	retreated)	is	thereby	reinterpreted	as	a	constitutive	property	of	the	ideal	
itself,	which	needs	 this	 temporary	withdrawal	 from	 the	world	 (to	which	 it	
must	ultimately	return	in	order	to	come	to	full,	objective	existence)	in	order	to	
sustain	its	ideality	as	a	“pure	subject”.	It	is	also	through	this	very	same	retreat	
of	the	ideal	that	the	real	world	and	the	subjects	in	this	world	from	which	it	has	
distanced	itself	are	dialectically	stimulated,	or	one	could	even	say	forced,	to	
turn	towards	the	ideal	and	strive	to	attain	a	state	of	interconnection	with	the	
transcendent.
It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	dialectical	logic	employed	by	Mou	has	
lost	none	of	its	relevance	in	the	context	of	the	discourse	surrounding	the	revi-
val	of	Confucianism	in	contemporary	China.	As	I	have	tried	to	show	in	more	
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detail	elsewhere,55	most	arguments	that	are	overtly	aimed	at	(selectively)	re-
viving	traditional	cultural	in	the	context	of	the	post-revolutionary	condition	
on	the	mainland	are	unable	to	disentangle	themselves	from	the	logic	of	mo-
dernization	that	necessitated	a	“revival”	or	rather	reinvention	of	tradition	in	
the	first	place.	The	writings	of	many	conservative	modernizers	continue	to	be	
inspired	by	the	paradigm	of	culture	as	a	“Spirit”	following	its	own	trajectory	
and	employing	the	contingency	of	historical	occurrences	in	order	to	realize	
itself.	The	 concept	 of	 “Spirit”	 allows	major	 historical	 transformations	 and	
discontinuities	such	as	the	end	of	the	Chinese	empire	and	the	“end	of	the	revo-
lution”56	following	the	reforms	initiated	by	Deng	Xiaping	to	be	understood	as	
transitional	moments	in	a	long-term	process	of	autotelic	self-transformation.	
Ironically	 enough,	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 contingent	 status	 of	 histori-
cal	“external	conditions”	and	the	transcendentally	constituted	internal	flight	
plan	of	Spirit	through	history	restores	the	very	same	dichotomies	which	are	
commonly	rejected	as	“metaphysical”	and	“un-Chinese”	in	attempts	to	com-
paratively	ground	 the	specificity	of	Chinese	 thought	 in	contrast	 to	 the	We-
stern	tradition.	Obviously,	the	residual	difference	between	essence	(cultural	
continuity)	and	appearance	(the	loss	of	tradition	as	a	self-sufficient	source	of	
legitimacy)	has	to	be	accounted	for	in	one	way	or	another.	The	Hegelian	dic-
tum	that	“essence	must	appear”57	was	taken	to	heart	by	the	first	generations	
of	New	Confucian	philosophers	who	still	had	no	trouble	invoking	the	name	
of	Hegel	as	an	ally	against	 the	historical	materialism	of	Marx.	Postmodern	
condemnations	 of	Hegel	 as	 an	 archetypal	 “identity	 thinker”,	 in	 combinati-
on	with	the	culturalist	outlook	that	dominates	comparative	philosophy,	have	
made	the	alliance	between	the	German	Idealist	and	the	movement	of	modern	
Confucianism	less	evident.	The	paradoxes	that	result	from	inscribing	nega-
tivity	into	the	heart	of	a	supremely	self-identical	“Spirit”	of	culture	surface	
more	arrestingly	in	the	absence	of	Mou	Zongsan’s	and	Tang	Junyi’s	dialecti-
cal	style	of	reasoning.	As	a	result,	an	acute	contradiction	between	anti-dualist	
philosophical	presuppositions	(“holism”,	“correlative	thinking”)	and	a	rein-
statement	of	dualism	on	the	level	of	discourse	about	culture	imposes	itself.	
Tu	Wei-ming,	who	is	probably	the	most	famous	spokesman	for	the	revival	of	
Confucianism	 in	 contemporary	China,	 is	 known	 for	 his	 universalist	 stance	
and	embracive	position	vis-à-vis	other	world	religions,	which	he	tries	to	bring	
into	 a	 constructive	dialog	with	Confucianism.	However,	 in	 arguing	 for	 the	
value	of	Confucianism	in	the	modern	globalized	world,	the	aforementioned	
contradiction	comes	to	the	surface	in	all	its	bareness:
“The modern West’s dichotomous world view	 (spirit/	matter,	mind/body,	physical/mental,	 sa-
cred/profane,	creator/creature,	God/man,	 subject/object)	 is diametrically opposed to the Chi­
nese holistic mode of thinking	[…]	the	Enlightenment	mentality	is so radically different from 
any style of thought familiar to the Chinese mind that it challenges all dimensions of the Sinic 
world.”58
What	 is	 striking	 about	 this	 passage	 is	 that	 any	 critical	 force	 its	 rather	 co-
mmonplace	rejection	of	purportedly	typically	“Western”	dichotomies	might	
have	is	 immediately	neutralized	by	the	fact	 that	 it	 reinstates	precisely	such	
a	 binary	 opposition	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 dichotomous	 distinction	 between	 the	
“West”	and	the	“Sinic	world”.	Instead	of	grounding	the	dichotomies	Tu	re-
jects	 in	 a	 “worldview”	 particular	 to	 a	 certain	 culture,	 it	would	 perhaps	 be	
more	appropriate	and	meaningful	to	try	and	grasp	them	as	symptomatic	of	a	
particular	logic	of	historical	development	that	has	affected	societies	all	acro-
ss	 the	 globe	 irrespective	 of	 their	 cultural	 background.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	
one	of	the	most	important	functions	the	concept	of	culture	as	Spirit	fulfills	
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in	Mou’s	and	Tang’s	 thought	 is	 identifying	 the	qualitatively	unprecedented	
discontinuity	of	modernity	as	part	of	a	continuous	trajectory	that	is	not	out-
side	of	the	inner	principle	of	mobility	of	this	transhistorical	Subject.	Yingjie	
Guo	is	certainly	justified	in	raising	the	following	question:	“Confucians	have	
been	trying	to	reinterpret,	reinvent	or	‘modernize’	Confucianism	in	order	to	
make	it	more	relevant	and	appealing	to	contemporary	Chinese.	The question 
is whether or not Confucianism can be modernized without losing its self­
identity.”59	But	obviously,	the	threat	of	a	loss	of	self-identity	can	be	warded	
off	by	inscribing	non-identity	and	discontinuity	into	the	same	dynamic	which	
allows	Spirit	to	realize	itself.	This	in	my	view	is	one	of	the	primary	functions	
of	dialectical	logic	in	the	works	of	Tang	and	Mou.	It	is	not	merely	a	“magic	
trick”	they	use	to	violate	common	sense	and	obfuscate	problems	of	a	deter-
minate	historical	and	social	origin.60	Wang	Xueqing	and	Liao	Junyu	are	are	
I	think	right	to	stress	that	the	fundamental	difference	between	Tang’s	idea	of	
the	moral	self	(daode ziwo)	and	the	traditional	Confucian	idea	of	morality	is	
that	Tang	proposes	that	the	moral	subject	must	first	go	through	a	form	of	what	
Wang	and	Liao	call	“self-disintegration”	(ziwo bengjie).61	It	is	through	such	
a	form	of	strategic	self-negation	that	difference	can	be	grasped	as	a	modality	
of	sameness.	In	Hegelian	terms,	immediate,	unreflective	self-identity	must	be	
subjected	to	a	process	of	negation,	after	which	the	initial	identity	can	be	su-
blated	(Aufgehoben)	at	a	higher	level	by	including	non-identity	into	the	iden-
tical.	Zhang	Yixin	believes	that	Tang’s	highly	selective	use	of	Hegel	becomes	
apparent	in	his	intentional	abandonment	of	the	historical	character	of	Spirit	
(Geist).	According	to	Zhang,	the	moral	self	Tang	endowed	with	the	qualities	
of	the	Hegelian	Geist is	an	atemporal	entity	purified	of	external	historical	de-
terminations.62	But	she	does	not	stop	to	consider	the	possibility	that	this	(far	
from	complete)	purification	from	history	is	itself	historically	conditioned,	in	
the	sense	that	Tang’s	immunization	of	the	moral	self	against	historical	change	
can	be	understood	as	being	directed	against	a	particular	developmental	logic	
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of	history	in	which	the	tradition	he	wanted	to	uphold	and	safeguard	had	be-
come	to	a	great	extent	institutionally	effaced	and	had	to	be	incorporated	into	
the	modern	coordinates	of	knowledge	in	order	to	survive.	In	this	regard,	it	is	
all	very	well	to	stress	that	the	concept	of	a	Spirit	which	is	“not	only	substance,	
but	also	subject”,63	is	incompatible	with	or	even	contradictory	to	traditional	
forms	of	Chinese	thought,	which	indeed	generally	never	showed	a	proclivity	
for	such	metaphysical	distinctions.	However,	one	cannot	thereby	bypass	the	
question	as	to	why philosophers	such	as	Tang	and	Mou,	despite	their	uncea-
sing	efforts	to	philosophically	combat	and	transcend	categorical	ontological	
and	 epistemological	 bifurcations,	were	 unwilling	 to	 abandon	 the	 idea	 of	 a	
substantial	 Spirit	 (and	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 the	 phenomenal	 and	 the	
noumenal)	for	what	David	Hall	and	Roger	Ames	take	to	be	the	“radical	im-
manence”	characteristic	of	Chinese	(Confucian)	thought.64	Perhaps	one	could	
say	that	what	is	philosophically	most	disagreeable	about	their	work	is	at	the	
same	time	what	is	historically	most	interesting.	As	Fabian	Heubel	points	out,	
insisting	on	the	pervasiveness	of	complete	immanence	is	often	linked	to	the	
idea	that	Chinese	thought	is	characterized	by	a	sense	of	passive	conformity	
and	a	lack	of	critical	distance	from	the	world.65	The	themes	of	Spirit	and	tran-
scendence	in	both	Tang’s	and	Mou’s	work	can	in	my	view	be	interpreted	as	a	
space	for	critical	reflection	on	the	historical	condition	in	which	comparatively	
established	cultural	generalizations,	such	as	the	one	based	on	the	distinction	
between	transcendence	and	immanence,	are	established.	In	any	case,	as	I	tried	
to	indicate,	the	metaphysics	of	Spirit	is	apparently	perfectly	able	to	endure	a	
rhetorical	dismissal	of	metaphysical	distinctions,	which	can	be	reinstated	in	
the	very	act	of	dismissing	them	as	alien	to	Spirit.	As	Hegel	already	knew,	the	
latter	“contains	a	becoming­other”,	its	life	not	being	one	which	“shrinks	from	
death	and	keeps	itself	untouched	by	devastation,	but	rather	[…]	endures	it	and	
maintains	itself	in	it”,	so	that	it	“wins	its	truth	only	when,	in	utter	dismember-
ment,	it	finds	itself”.66
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“Kada	duh	u	krajnjoj	razjedinjenosti	pronađe	sebe”
Razmišljanja o filozofiji novog konfucijanizma i problemu 
povijesnog diskontinuiteta
Sažetak
U radu se razmatra pitanje kulturnog kontinuiteta u kontekstu problema moderniteta kroz medij 
posebnog slučaja filozofije novog konfucijanizma. Iz historijske perspektive ispituje se uvoz 
pojma ‘kultura’ te istražuje kako su moderni konfucijanistički filozofi poput Mou Zongsana 
i Tang Junyija koristili hegelijanski pojam duha kao konceptualnu strategiju suočavajući se 
sa strukturnim i semantičkim diskontinuitetima koji su nastali modernizacijom. Pri tomu se 
posebna pažnja posvećuje simboličkom Pokretu četvrtog svibnja kako bi se približilo Mouovim 
i Tangovim stavovima o povijesnom (dis)kontinuitetu te uputilo na suvremeni značaj njihova 
filozofskog pothvata.
Ključne	riječi
novi	konfucijanizam,	moderna	kineska	filozofija,	Pokret	četvrtog	svibnja,	Mou	Zongsan,	Tang	Junyi,	
povijest,	kulturne	samodeskripcije,	paradoksi	u	komparativnoj	filozofiji
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„Wenn der Geist in vollkommener Zersplitterung sich selbst findet“
Reflexionen über die neue konfuzianische Philosophie und das 
Problem der historischen Diskontinuität
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel stelle ich Untersuchungen an über die Frage der kulturellen Kontinuität vor 
dem Hintergrund des Problems der Modernität durch das Medium des spezifischen Falls des 
neuen Konfuzianismus. Vom historischen Standpunkt aus befasse mich ich mit der Bedeutung 
des Begriffs „Kultur“ und untersuche, wie moderne konfuzianische Philosophen wie Mou Zong­
san und Tang Junyi die hegelianische Notion des „Geistes“ als konzeptuelle Strategie angewen­
det haben, und zwar im Lichte der aus der Modernisierung resultierenden strukturellen und se­
mantischen Diskontinuitäten. Dabei würde ich die symbolische Bewegung des vierten Mai her­
ausheben, um an Mous und Tangs Einstellung zur historischen (Dis)kontinuität heranzugehen 
sowie auf die zeitgenössische Bedeutung ihres philosophischen Unternehmens hinzudeuten.
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